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Researchers have long been interested in understanding the motives behind CEOs’ ac-
tions. On the one hand, CEOs may pursue strategic actions because they are confident
they will enhance firm value. Alternatively, CEOsmay take actions evenwhen they have
low confidence in the value of those actions, perhaps driven by self-interest or social
pressures. Although research suggests that CEO option exercises following an acquisi-
tion announcement are an ex post behavioral outcome of low CEO confidence in the
acquisition’s value-creation potential, prior research has not identified any ex ante
signals shareholders can look for to assess acquiring CEOs’ confidence when the ac-
quisition is announced. We address this concern by exploring a potential early warning
signal of low CEO confidence: impression offsetting. We theorize that impression
offsetting—measured as other unrelated positive announcements made by the firm in
the days immediately surrounding the acquisition announcement—may serve as an ex
ante signal of low CEO confidence in the acquisition’s value-creation potential, and, as
such, will be positively associated with CEO option exercises, an ex post behavioral
outcome of low confidence. We test our theory with a sample of 491 large acquisitions
and find consistent support for our hypotheses.
Scholars argue that CEOs’ strategic actions are driven
by various motives. Some actions are undertaken be-
cause CEOs are confident these actions will increase
long-term firm value, while others are done to accrue
private benefits for the CEO (e.g., higher pay, greater
power) or in response to external pressures (e.g., growth
demands, merger waves). When actions are primarily
driven byprivate interestmotives or external pressures,
CEOs are likely to be less confident that these actions
will create long-term firm value (Devers, McNamara,
Haleblian, & Yoder, 2013). Agency costs arise when
CEOs pursue actions in respect of which they have
low confidence regarding their long-term firm value-
creation potential (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Due to
information asymmetries, however, discerning a CEO’s
motives foragivenstrategicaction isextremelydifficult.
Thus, investors are often forced to rely onweak proxies
to estimate the long-term value-creation potential of
the actions CEOs pursue (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).
Concerns regarding instances inwhichCEOs take ac-
tions that do not serve shareholder interests drive sig-
nificant government oversight and regulation (e.g.,
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Dodd–Frank Act of 2010)
as well as academic and practitioner scrutiny (Bebchuk
We would like to thank deputy editor Marc Gruber and
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& Fried, 2003; Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus,
2016). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that CEOs are
regularly rewarded for engaging in actions that can
erodeshareholdervalue (Bliss&Rosen,2001;Haleblian,
Devers,McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). These
findings leadsomescholars toargue that thegovernance
policiesdesignedtoalignCEOandshareholder interests
are often ineffective (Boivie et al., 2016Q:1 ). The popular
pressechoes theseconcernswithheadlinessuchas“Pay
for Performance? Coal CEOsGet Bonuses as Companies
Lose Billions” (Nicklaus, 2016) and “Failed CEOsTruly
Can Have It All” (Evans, 2016).
One setting where investors struggle to evaluate CEO
motives and determine long-term value potential is in
the context of large acquisitions (Devers et al., 2013;
Schijven&Hitt,2012;Zollo&Meier,2008).Researchhas
identified a range of motives for acquisitions, some of
which are value creating and others that are not. Spe-
cifically, some CEOs are motivated to acquire for the
benefit of their shareholders, believing the acquisitions
they champion will lead to a valuable combination of
assets, market power gains, or efficiency improvements
(Haleblianet al., 2009).With suchmotivations,CEOsare
likelyconfident in the long-termvalue-creationpotential
of these acquisitions—what we refer to as “acquisition-
related confidence.” Other CEOs, however, may view
acquisitions as a form of empire building that increases
their compensation and power, or to address social
pressures, suchasbandwagonpressuresassociatedwith
acquisitionwaves (Devers et al., 2013;Kim,Haleblian, &
Finkelstein, 2011; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes,
2008). Such CEOs are likely to be less confident that
these acquisitions will generate long-term shareholder
value (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Seo, Gamache,
Devers, & Carpenter, 2015). Although CEOs possess
private information about the long-term value prospects
of their acquisitions, investors must rely on public in-
formation to inform their evaluation (Schijven & Hitt,
2012). Thus, while research suggests some acquisitions
are pursued even though CEOs are not confident they
will generate shareholder value, we are unaware of
any clear a priori signals regarding which acquisitions
CEOs pursue under this condition.
This void leads us to our overarching research ques-
tion: Is there a means by which investors can gauge a
CEO’s confidence in an acquisition when it is an-
nounced? If such a signal exists, it could provide in-
vestors with an early warning that illuminates when
acquiring CEOs have low confidence in the long-term
value-creation potential of their newly announced ac-
quisitions. Research suggests that CEO stock option
exercises in the months following major acquisition an-
nouncements are an ex post behavioral outcome of
CEOs’ level of confidence in the value-creationpotential
of thosedeals (Deversetal., 2013).Nevertheless,because
investors only have access to such stock option exercise
evidencewell after the acquisition has been announced,
their ability to respond preemptively by adjusting their
equity holdings, or attempting to discourage the firm
from completing an announced acquisition, is con-
strained. To date, no ex ante or preemptive signal of
CEO acquisition-related confidence exists.
In this study, we suggest that “impression offsetting”
is a behavior that may serve as an early warning signal
that CEOs have low confidence in the long-term value-
enhancing potential of an acquisition. Impression
offsetting is a form of anticipatory impression manage-
ment that is “initiated to positively influence external
perceptions of the organization by releasing positive,
but unrelated information, in anticipation of an event
becoming known that may negatively violate external
stakeholder expectations” (Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley,
2016: 233). Extant research has explored the timing,
focus, and purpose of impression offsetting, suggesting
that it is undertaken to reduce the scrutiny firms may
face regarding their strategic actions (Graffin et al.,
2016). Research, however, has not explored why CEOs
choose to engage in impression offsetting around some
actions but not others (Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie,
2011; Graffin et al., 2016). This absence is critical as it
speaks to the ultimate motivations of CEOs in their
strategic decision-making. Advancing this line of re-
search, we thus theorize that CEOs aremotivated to use
impressionoffsettingwhen theyhave lowconfidence in
the value potential of an action they are announcing.
To address our core question, we develop theory that
suggests a positive association between impression off-
settingsurrounding theannouncementofanacquisition
(Graffin et al., 2016) andCEOoptionexercises following
that announcement. We theorize that impression off-
settingaroundacquisitionannouncementsmayserveas
an ex ante signal of low CEO confidence in the value-
creation potential of acquisitions. As such, we expect
that impression offsetting will be positively associated
with ex post behavioral outcomes associated with low
confidence in the value-creation potential of deals, as
evidencedbyCEOoptionexercises (Devers et al., 2013).
While we cannot directly measure CEO confidence
(indeed even survey measures would be subject to
substantial desirability biases), CEO equity actions—in
the form of when they choose to exercise options—
serves as an established proxy for executive confidence
(Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, & Stanley,
2011; Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015; Devers et al., 2013;
Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997;
Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008).We further argue that,
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when CEOs perceive greater personal downside risk
related to an acquisition, impression offsetting will be
an even stronger signal that CEOs have low confidence
in the value potential of their acquisitions and thus
strengthen the positive association between impression
offsetting and CEO option exercises. We test this prop-
osition by examining CEO-, firm-, and industry-level
conditions that lead CEOs to perceive higher downside
acquisition-related potential. We theorize that, due to
this increased downside risk salience, the positive as-
sociationbetweenimpressionoffsettingandsubsequent
CEO options exercised will be stronger as acquiring
CEOsattempt toreduce firmscrutinyandlimit threats to
their equity value.
We see three central contributions from our study.
First, we contribute to theory on impression manage-
ment by providing evidence for a specific motivation
for the use of anticipatory impression management.
Indeed, existing theory in this area has not explored
the motivations associated with impression manage-
ment (e.g., Graffin et al., 2011). By linking impression
offsetting around acquisitions to CEOoption exercises
following acquisition announcements, we extend
impression management research and suggest CEOs
engage in impression offsetting when they have low
confidence in the value-creation potential of actions.
Second, our study reveals an early signal for when
CEOs are acquiring even though they have low confi-
dence in the deal’s long-term value-creation potential.
Thus,we theoreticallyderiveandempiricallysupport the
existenceof a tangible action shareholders canuse to gain
insight into themotivesof theCEOswhochampion those
deals. Further, our theory and empirical findings suggest
impression offsetting becomes an even stronger signal of
low confidence when downside risk salience is high.
Third, we provide important implications for other
theoretical perspectives, specifically signaling theory
(see Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011, for a re-
view) and behavioral theory (Bromiley, 1991; Greve,
2003). Perhaps surprisingly, signaling theory research
primarily focuses on intentional signals that executives
send (Connelly et al., 2011). However, importantly, we
find evidence of an unintended signal that CEOs may
send by using impression offsetting—a lack of confi-
dence in the value-creation potential of an acquisition.
Indeed, impression offsetting may be a valuable, but
unintended, signal of which investors are yet unaware.
We believe that our findings may spark a new line of
research investigating the existence of other such un-
intended signals that executives send. Finally, our re-
sults provide an important contribution to behavioral
theory, by offering the ability to assess the degree of
confidence CEOs have in a range of actions that may be
driven by behavioral processes, such as actions arising
from problemistic versus slack search.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Motivations for Acquisitions
The primary goal of corporate governance is to en-
sure CEOs undertake actions that provide value for
their firm through effective monitoring and incentive
programs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Substantial evi-
dence, however, suggests that acquisitions generally
donot enhance firmvalue (Christensen,Alton, Rising,
&Waldeck, 2011; Haleblian et al., 2009; King, Dalton,
Daily,&Covin, 2004), and frequently result innegative
market reactions (Datta, Iskandar‐Datta, & Raman,
2001;Datta, Pinches,&Narayanan, 1992;Graffin et al.,
2016). Despite this evidence, top managers invest
trillions of dollars (U.S.) in acquisitions each year.
Given the uncertain value creation associated with
acquisitions, shareholders are likely interested in CEOs’
motivations for pursuing them. On the one hand, CEOs
may pursue acquisitions because they are confident the
acquisitionwill create long-termvalue. This could occur
when acquisitions trigger greater market power and re-
duce competition (Devers et al., 2013; Kim & Singal,
1993), increase efficiency (Holcomb, Holmes, & Hitt,
2006), enhance internal synergy opportunities (Hitt,
Ireland, & Harrison, 2001; Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993),
or allow access to scarce resources (Puranam&Srikanth,
2007; Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006). CEOs may
also believe they have private information about the tar-
get’s valuation, allowing them toacquireanundervalued
asset (McNamara et al., 2008; Myers &Majluf, 1984).
On the other hand, a more troublesome category of
motives occurs when CEOs pursue acquisitions for
which they have low confidence in their long-term
value-creation potential (Devers et al., 2013). Impor-
tantly, we are not suggesting that CEOs make acquisi-
tions when they are confident it will destroy value;
rather, they are simplynot highly confident itwill create
long-termvalue for shareholders. Research suggests two
reasons why CEOs may have low confidence in their
acquisitions. First, CEOs may acquire for their personal
gain (Haleblian et al., 2009) because “even mergers
which reduce shareholder value can be in a manager’s
private interest” (Bliss & Rosen, 2001: 110). CEOs may
thus have self-interested motives for acquiring—most
notably,compensationbenefits (Seoetal.,2015). Indeed,
a CEO’s pay tends to increase following an acquisition
whether or not it provides shareholder value (Bliss &
Rosen, 2001; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Harford & Li,
2007). Moreover, acquisitions are associated with even
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more rapid pay increases than those from similar levels
of organic growth (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Grinstein &
Hribar, 2004; Harford & Li, 2007). Acquisitions can also
benefit CEOs by increasing the complexity and scope of
their firms, which may exacerbate information asym-
metries and restrict outside monitoring and evaluation
(Bloom&Milkovich, 1998; Devers et al., 2013; Milgrom
& Roberts, 1982), enhance managerial discretion and
bargaining power (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney,
2005; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996), and further en-
trench top managers (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Walsh &
Seward,1990).Thus,despitepublicprofessionsofvalue-
creating motives, research suggests acquisitions may be
driven by self-interestedmotives (Devers et al., 2013).
Second, CEOs may pursue acquisitions in response
to social pressures they face, such as competitive
pressure during acquisition waves or from power-
ful stakeholders, such as activist investors or finan-
cial analysts (Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Haleblian,
McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; Kim et al., 2011).
Also, as firms identify and negotiate with potential
acquisition targets, the time and money the firms
expend and the trust they buildwith target firmsmay
create social pressures that lead to an escalation of
commitment to proceed with the acquisition even
when theCEOcomes to question its value (Schijven&
Hitt, 2012). In these situations, CEOs are likely to have
low confidence in their acquisitions’ long-term value-
creation potential, because their primary motives are
responding to social pressures rather than pursuing
value-creationopportunities.Regardlessof thedrivers,
investors benefit from knowingwhen a CEO ismaking
an acquisition in which they have low confidence.
To tease out CEOmotivations, researchers have used
changes inCEOoptionholdingsasabehavioraloutcome
regarding the level of confidence CEOs have in their
firms’ value-creation potential (Campbell et al., 2011;
Chen et al., 2015; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Hayward &
Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008).1
Thus, while we are not able to directly measure CEO
confidence, in our context, exercising options following
an acquisition is an ex post behavioral outcome of CEO
confidence in the long-termvalue-creationpotential of a
deal (Devers et al., 2013). If acquiringCEOsareconfident
theacquisitionwill lead to futurevaluecreation—that is,
they possess what we refer to as “acquisition-related
confidence”—they likely believe the firm’s stock price
will increase as the value of the acquisition becomes
apparent. Accordingly, CEOswith such confidencewill
tend to hold their stock options so they can enjoy the
expected stock appreciation (Devers et al., 2013). In
contrast, if CEOs have low acquisition-related confi-
dence, they likely have less confidence in the future
value of their stock options, as investors are prone to
react negatively, once it becomes apparent that the ac-
quisitionmaynotgenerateshareholdervalue.CEOswho
have low acquisition-related confidence are thus likely
to exercise at least a portion of their at-risk stock options
after acquisition announcements, to limit losses to ac-
cumulated equity value (Devers et al., 2013).
Although post-announcement stock option exer-
cises provide an ex post behavioral outcome of CEO
acquisition-related confidence, such exercises do
not indicate which acquisitions CEOs have low
confidence in at the time of announcement. Of
course, at the time of the announcement, investors
and CEOs must deal with uncertainty about the
economic consequences of particular acquisitions.
Indeed, both investors and CEOs have incomplete
information regarding the target firm and the value
that will result from the combined entity (Delong &
Deyoung, 2007). Investors, however, almost always
have less information than managers (Delong &
Deyoung, 2007; Schijven & Hitt, 2012). For in-
stance, in conducting due diligence prior to an-
nouncing the acquisition, the acquiring firm has the
opportunity to assess the target, which typically in-
volves extensive financial and strategic information
not available to investors.Managers are thus likely to
have superior information and, in turn, a more ac-
curate assessment of likely acquisition outcomes
(Haleblian et al., 2009; Schijven & Hitt, 2012). While
some factors such as premium paid and percentage
of stock used in an acquisition may inform inves-
tors’ evaluation of that acquisition’s potential value
(Schijven & Hitt, 2012), CEO motives underlying
specific deals remain difficult to discern upon an-
nouncement. We argue that “impression offsetting”—
making additional unrelated positive material
announcements—at the time of the acquisition an-
nouncement acts as an earlywarning signal, providing
stakeholders with an understanding of whether or not
1 We focus on “situation-specific confidence”—the con-
fidence the CEO has in the long-term value-creation poten-
tial of the acquisition. Importantly, situation-specific
confidence is not the same as a CEO’s generalized trait level
of (over-)confidence or hubris (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick,
1997). While trait (over-)confidence certainly influences a
CEO’s tendency to be confident in a particular acquisition,
the decision to acquire for self-interested motives or in re-
sponse to social pressures will make them less confident
than otherwise (perhaps still fairly confident, compared to
CEOswith low trait overconfidence, but less confident than
they would normally feel). In other words, even CEOs who
are overconfident by nature can be less confident about the
value-creation potential of specific firm actions.
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the CEO is confident in the acquisition and, therefore,
may be primarily driven by long-term firm value cre-
ation or self-interested motives.
As such, our theoretical arguments focus on the
proposed association between two discrete actions
that we believe offer insight into CEO acquisition-
related confidence at distinct points in time. As
we noted, prior work argues and provides evidence
that CEO option exercises following acquisition an-
nouncements are a behavioral outcome associated
with low CEO confidence in the long-term value po-
tential of anacquisition (Devers et al., 2013).Our study
advances this research by proposing that impression
offsetting functions as an early warning signal in-
dicating that acquiring CEOs have low confidence in
the ability of their announced acquisitions to enhance
firmvalue. Priorwork (e.g.,Graffin et al., 2016) has not
explored why CEOs make additional unrelated posi-
tive announcements surrounding an acquisition. In
the following section, we argue that impression off-
setting can serve as an ex ante signal that acquiring
CEOs have low confidence in the value-creation po-
tential of announced acquisitions, and, as such, we
expect that impression offsetting will be positively
associated with subsequent CEO option exercises.
Impression Offsetting as an Early Warning
The literatureon impressionmanagement focuseson
techniques used by managers to influence perceptions
of theirorganizations (Bansal&Clelland,2004;Elsbach,
2003; Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 1998). Although this
work has also shown that impressionmanagement can
either be reactive or anticipatory (Elsbach, 2006), most
has focused on “reactive impression management”—
steps taken to influence perceptions in response to a
negative event that was unanticipated by the organi-
zation (Elsbach, 2012). More recent research, however,
has begun to emphasize the importance of “anticipa-
tory impressionmanagement” (hereafter, “AIM”). AIM
tacticsoccurwhenorganizationsact to influencepublic
perceptions before or contemporaneous to an event
(Busenbark, Lange, & Certo, 2017; Graffin et al., 2011;
Holcomb et al., 2006).
Research on impression management provides
evidence for two key points: (1) CEOs frequently di-
rect their public or investors relations staff to engage
in impression management; and (2) through the use
of impression management techniques, CEOs are
able to effectively influence stakeholder opinions.
First, research suggests that CEOs actively shape
media coverage through their use of public relations,
press releases, and social media (Farrell & Whidbee,
2002; Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2018).
Indeed, CEOs go through substantial efforts to in-
fluence stakeholders in this way; Westphal and
Deephouse (2011), for example, have shown that
CEOs actively engage in ingratiation behaviors with
journalists in attempts to positively influence how
the firm is covered and even punish journalists who
portray them unfavorably by subsequently refusing
to speak with those journalists (also see Shani &
Westphal, 2016).
More directly connected toAIM, research suggests
that CEOs and boards strategically guide the timing
of press releases to coincide with other important
events (Blankespoor & deHaan, 2015; Graffin et al.,
2011; Graffin et al., 2016). In this vein, Graffin and
colleagues (2011: 750) quoted adirector commenting
on the strategic release of information around a CEO
hire announcement as follows:
We’ve tried to avoid any secondguessing [by the stock
market] by making sure that we announce the new
CEOat a timewhen a lot of other stuff is going on. This
way, if the market does react negatively, it’s pretty
easy to say it was not the CEO announcement.
In our own conversationswith CEOs, we find similar
evidence. For example, the CEO of an FTSE 100
company discussed the focus they have on directing
public relations activities:
I have consolidated all of our communications activ-
ities under a single person who is an expert so that
investor relations, media relations, internal comms
. . . But the main thing is that everybody is singing off
the same song sheet nomatterwho the audience is. . . .
[The media] will form their own views but a lot of it
has to do with . . . how you shape the messages. . . .
And then we line up all of our subsequent media ac-
tivities . . . and key media message pieces that have
been developed all by the same team that was all sit-
ting around the big table, which includes me and the
CFO as well.
Secondly, research also demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of the actions CEOs take to influence
stakeholder opinions, such as how firms engage in
symbolic actions to shape external observers’ im-
pressions (e.g., Bednar, 2012; Davis, 2005; Elsbach,
1994;Westphal &Zajac, 1998; Zott &Huy, 2007). For
instance, Westphal and Zajac (1998) found the
market responded positively to the announcement
of the adoption of long-term incentive programs—
even when those programs were not implemented.
This suggests that shareholders respond positively
to announcements by the firm—even when those
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announcements do not align with actual behavior.
Research also provides evidence that the market
responds positively to the announcement of stock
repurchase programs and does not correct itself
when these plans are not actually implemented
(Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 2004).
More recently, Bednar (2012) showed that symbolic
actions shape positive media coverage, finding that
symbolic governance reform announcements
resulted in more positive coverage from the media.
Finally, andmost closely tied to our specific context,
Graffin and colleagues (2016) found a systematic
relationship between impression offsetting around
an acquisition and the market reaction to those ac-
quisitions, thus providing strong evidence for the
effectiveness of AIM.
Despite evidence of its effectiveness, theory on
AIM has not explored what motivates CEOs’ use of
these techniques. For example, in a study of the use
of AIM around CEO succession announcements,
Graffin and colleagues (2011: 767) noted:
[Directors] might be trying to protect their own inter-
ests by obfuscating CEO succession announcements, if
it is self-serving to prevent assessing shareholder re-
action to the decision.Or, despite a conviction that they
have hired exactly the right CEO to lead the corporation
forward, they may be looking out for the best interest
of the organization and guarding against information
asymmetry.
Although this work focused on CEO succession sit-
uations, its general argument that the motives for
AIM are unclear is applicable to AIM used around
any strategic action, including acquisitions.
Accordingly, our study also pursues a secondary
research question: Why do CEOs use AIM? We be-
lieve that CEOs’ fear of scrutiny is likely influenced
by the confidence they have in the actions they
pursue.Therefore,we theorize that,whenCEOshave
low confidence in the value-creation potential of
their actions, they employ impression offsetting to
reduce external scrutiny of those strategic actions,
shield themselves from criticism, and protect the
value of their variable compensation and the equity
they have accumulated in their firm. By proposing
that impression offsetting is an early warning signal
of low confidence in the value potential of an-
nounced strategic actions, we theorize that CEOs are
motivated to use impression offsetting when they
question the value potential of an action.
One type of AIM prevalent around acquisitions is
impression offsetting (Graffin et al., 2016). With this
impression management technique, firms “offset” a
potential negative reactionby intentionally releasing
unrelated, positive information surrounding an an-
nouncement (Graffin et al., 2016). The release of
positive information provides additional factors that
investors must consider. Instead of being able to fo-
cus on one particular event (to which they might
react negatively), investors now must consider in-
formation regarding multiple events. This inhibits
their ability to isolate the effects of any particular
event (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). While Graffin
and colleagues (2016) found that firms engage in
impression offsetting around acquisitions and that
this practice is effective at buffering against negative
market reactions, they did not explore what moti-
vatesCEOs to engage in this impressionmanagement
tactic. Addressing this open question regarding
executives’ motivations for engaging in impression
activities is an important opportunity to enhance
the literature. Indeed,while self-servingmotivations
and value-creation motivations may result in out-
wardly identical actions, better understanding these
motivations has important corporate governance im-
plications. In thispaper,we lookdirectly at a behavior
that follows the use of impression offsetting—the ex-
ercising of stock options—that suggests impression
offsetting is used when CEOs lack confidence in the
long-term value potential of a deal.
One example of impression offsetting appears evi-
dent in Chevron’s acquisition of Unocal on April 4,
2005; the firm made three positive but unrelated an-
nouncements all on the day following the acquisition.
In one, Chevron announced a supply deal: “Hebron
Unitization and Joint Operating Agreement Signed.”
Another announcement disclosed a deal to increase
gas volumes: “ChevronTexaco signs Framework
Agreement for Australian Gas Resources: Customers
Will Have Access to Increased Gas Volumes from Gi-
ant Greater Gargon Area.” Finally, they announced
that an oil product had reached new standard re-
quirements: “Chevron Delo 400 Multigrade Diesel
Engine Oil Meets New European ACEA E7-04 Speci-
fication; Delo Meets Rigorous Requirements, Re-
inforces Global Platform Position.” Interestingly,
ChevronacquiredUnocal after fightingoff acompeting
bid by Cnooc, a Chinese petroleum firm, possibly
leading the CEO of Chevron to question whether the
value of the acquisition would justify the heightened
price Chevron paid.
We suggest that impression offsetting can serve as
an early warning that CEOs may be making an
acquisition in which they have low value creation-
related confidence. If, as we argue, impression off-
setting is an ex ante signal of CEO low acquisition
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confidence, we expect that the release of additional
positive, but unrelated, information around an ac-
quisition surrounding acquisition announcements
will be positively related to subsequent option ex-
ercises, an ex post behavioral outcome of low confi-
dence in the value-creation potential of that action.
More specifically, we propose that CEOs will use
impression offsetting when they have low confi-
dence in the long-term value potential of an acqui-
sition for two primary reasons: the release of
additional positive information can (1) reduce the
scrutiny firms face regarding the acquisition and (2)
buffer against potential negative market reactions,
thereby protecting the accumulated value of CEOs’
stock options. For example, when acquiring CEOs
have low, rather than high, acquisition-related con-
fidence, they are more likely to release additional
information in order to reduce the external scrutiny
those acquisitions face. If CEOs are not confident
about the long-term value of an acquisition, they are
likely concerned that investorswill also be skeptical,
question their decision, and may even attempt to
block completion of the acquisition. We argue,
however, that, by releasing positive but unrelated
information at the time of announcement, acquiring
CEOs try to “offset” the likelihood that their an-
nouncement will be perceived negatively by share-
holders (Graffin et al., 2016: 233). This positive
information, therefore, is aimed at directing share-
holder attention away from the acquisition and
making the ability to isolate the market’s assessment
of any specific strategic action more difficult. Con-
cern about negative investor reactions is likely to be
especially high for CEOs with low confidence in the
long-term value potential of the acquisition. Thus,
we attempt to contribute to the impression offsetting
literature by exploring a key motivation for using
impression offsetting not previously explored: low
CEO action-specific confidence.We argue that, when
CEOs have low acquisition-related confidence, they
will use impression offsetting to reduce scrutiny on
the acquisition announcement, thereby protecting
their personal compensation and equity holdings. In
contrast, when CEOs have high acquisition-related
confidence, they will refrain from releasing addi-
tional information so that stakeholders only focus on
the acquisition announcement.
Second, CEOs may use impression offsetting to
protect against a negative market reaction to the ac-
quisition to both reduce criticism from investors
regarding their leadership and to safeguard the accu-
mulated value of their equity portfolios. Because
CEOs are primarily compensated with stock-based
incentives and often hold substantial stock option
portfolios (Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter,
2010), they are keen to avoid potential negative mar-
ket reactions that may decrease the value of their
wealth. Consistent with this desire, the use of im-
pression offsetting has been shown to substantially
reduce negative market reactions to acquisitions
(Graffin et al., 2016). Building on this work, we argue
that CEOs are likely to use offsetting when their
acquisition-related confidence is low, as they are
concerned investors may respond negatively to those
deals, and thus reduce the value of their equity stake
in the firm. When CEOs’ acquisition-related confi-
dence is high, however, they will be less concerned
about the potential for negative reactions, and, as
such, be less likely to engage in impression offsetting.
Together, these arguments suggest that CEOs re-
lease positive but unrelated information around an
acquisition when they have low acquisition-related
confidence, to reduce investor scrutiny and protect
the value of their equity. On the other hand, when
CEO acquisition-related confidence is high, they
will prefer to focus attention on the acquisition,
and, as such, be less likely to release additional
positive information. We propose, then, that the use
of impression offsetting reflects an ex ante signal of
low CEO confidence in long-term acquisition value-
creation potential. If our proposition holds, impres-
sion offsetting should be positively related to CEO
post-acquisition option exercises, an ex post behav-
ioral outcome associated with low CEO confidence
in the potential of their acquisitions to enhance firm
value. As such, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. Impression offsetting around an ac-
quisition announcement will be positively associated
with the percentage of stock options exercised by the
CEO in the period following the announcement.
Influence of Salient Downside Risk
Although we argue that CEOs who acquire when
they have low (rather than high) confidence in their
potential to create long-term value are more likely
to use impression offsetting, we propose that this as-
sociation is not consistent across all situations. In
particular, research suggests that perceptions of
downside risk significantly impact CEO strategic de-
cisions (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Indeed, if
impression offsetting is used when CEOs have low
confidence in the value-creation potential of an ac-
quisition, it should be even more important to CEOs
when they sense higher downside risks. As a result,
when CEOs are highly cognizant of downside risks,
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we expect that the positive association between im-
pression offsetting around an acquisition announce-
ment and subsequent exercising of options is even
stronger.
Since releasing positive but unrelated information
around an acquisition can reduce scrutiny on the firm
and limit threats to accumulated equity value hold-
ings (Graffin et al., 2016), CEOsmay bemore prone to
employ impression offsetting as their downside risk
concerns increase. Although downside risk concerns
are unlikely to overwhelmpotential personal benefits
toCEOs fromacquiring, itmaymake themmore likely
to seek ways to reduce scrutiny and protect the value
of their equity. While all CEOs are concerned about
downside risk, we suggest that such concerns are
amplified in some situations. Carpenter,Geletkanycz,
and Sanders (2004) argued that CEOs’perceptions are
shaped by leadership-, firm-, and industry-level fac-
tors. This suggests that certain factors at each level of
analysis likely influence CEOs’ acquisition-related
downside risk perceptions. Extending this work, we
argue that CEO age, firm reputation, and industry
dynamism will each strengthen the positive associa-
tion between impression offsetting surrounding an
acquisition announcement and subsequent exercis-
ing of stock options.
Leadership-level moderator: CEO age.Research
suggests that CEOs are increasingly sensitive to
downside risks as they age (Finkelstein, Hambrick, &
Cannella, 2009; Serfling, 2014). We contend that,
when CEOs have low confidence in the long-term
value potential of their acquisitions, the association
between impression offsetting around acquisition
announcements and post-announcement option ex-
ercises will be stronger for older CEOs, for at least
three reasons. First, as CEOs age, they tend to focus
more on their financial security and retirement needs
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Older CEOs are therefore
more sensitive to potential declines in the value of
their equityholdings. These sameconcernsmaydrive
CEOs to make acquisitions in order to increase their
compensation before they retire. Yet, when they do
acquire, older CEOs may have greater concern about
their financial security than younger CEOs, making
the potential for negative market reactions particu-
larly salient to them. Thus, among CEOs who have
low confidence in the long-term value-creation po-
tential of acquisitions, we expect older CEOs to have
an increased propensity to announce unrelated posi-
tive information to counteract the potential for nega-
tive reactions, thus strengthening the underlying
positive association between impression offsetting
and subsequent option exercises.
Second, in general, older CEOs have shorter career
horizons. They are thus particularly attuned to ca-
reer security and likely to see greater risk to their
employment status when making acquisitions in
which their confidence in long-termvalue creation is
low (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Myers & Majluf,
1984). AsMcClelland andO’Brien (2011: 143) noted,
“The threat of being forced out might be particularly
poignant for older CEOs, as they are less likely than
are their younger counterparts to secure similar po-
sitions in peer firms.” These concerns may make the
potential managerial discretion and entrenchment
benefits of acquiring (Henderson & Fredrickson,
1996; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Walsh & Seward,
1990) particularly appealing to older CEOs. Yet,
when pursuing acquisitions in which they have low
confidence, they are likely more concerned about
heightened scrutiny that could trigger employment
risk than their younger CEO counterparts. For older
CEOs who have low acquisition-related confidence,
reducing scrutiny and limiting stock price decline
following acquisition announcements are important
reasons for releasing additional positive information
(Graffin et al., 2016), as each reduces the potential of
the acquisition being used as a reason to force them
out, thus strengthening the positive association be-
tween impression offsetting and subsequent stock
option exercising.
Third, as CEOs age, they tend to become increas-
ingly interested in building and ensuring their legacy
as strong leaders (Elliott & Shaw, 1988; Zacher,
Rosing, & Frese, 2011). Thus, while older CEOs may
see legacy value in growing the firm through acqui-
sitions, when they have low acquisition-related con-
fidence, they are likely to become more concerned
about limiting the scrutiny of outside evaluators,
which has the potential to undercut their legacies. As
a result, compared to younger CEOs, when older
CEOs have low acquisition-related confidence, they
are more likely to employ impression offsetting in
order to lessen scrutiny of these acquisitions so they
can improve their chances of cementing their legacies
as strong corporate leaders.As such,wewouldexpect
the positive association between impression off-
setting and subsequent exercising of stock options to
be stronger for older CEOs.
Taken together, our theory suggests that older CEOs
are particularly aware of downside risks to their finan-
cial situations, their formal positions, and their legacies.
As such,whenCEOshave lowconfidence in such long-
termvalue creation,wepropose that older CEOswill be
more likely to engage in offsetting than younger CEOs,
thus strengthening the positive association between
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impressionoffsettingandsubsequentoptionsexercised.
More formally, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. The association between impression
offsetting around an acquisition announcement and
subsequent stock options exercised by theCEOwill be
moderated by CEO age such that the association will
be stronger for older CEOs.
Firm-level moderator: Firm reputation. CEOs
alsohaveanelevated senseofdownside riskwhen they
lead high-reputation firms because their firms face
greater scrutiny and suffer more negative market re-
actions for negatively perceived events than do firms
without this asset (Graffin et al., 2016; Rhee &
Haunschild, 2006). As such, we argue that, among
acquiring CEOs, the association between impression
offsetting around acquisition announcements and
subsequent CEO option exercise will be stronger for
CEOs of high-reputation firms, for at least two reasons.
First, high-reputation firms face greater scrutiny than
other firms (Fombrun,1996).High-reputation firmsare,
by definition, well known and highly visible (Lange,
Lee, & Dai, 2011), thus their actions receive greater at-
tention and scrutiny than similar actions takenbyother
firms (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Zavyalova, Pfarrer,
Reger, & Hubbard, 2016). As we argued earlier, when
CEOs have low acquisition-related confidence, they
may make additional unrelated positive announce-
ments to reduce the scrutinyattributed toanyoneevent
and thereby protect their personal compensation and
equity holdings. We propose, therefore, that, when
CEOs of high-reputation firms have low acquisition-
related confidence, they will be more concerned about
the high level of scrutiny the deal will face, thus in-
creasing their propensity to engage in impression off-
setting, to lessenscrutinyof that strategicaction (Graffin
et al., 2016). Thus, amongCEOswith lowconfidence in
their acquisitions’ long-term value-creation potential,
impression offsetting becomes amore important signal
of low CEO confidence in the acquisition among high-
reputation firms. As such, the association between im-
pression offsetting around acquisition announcements
and subsequent stock option exercise should be stron-
ger for CEOs of high-reputation firms than for CEOs of
other firms.
Second, research suggests that high-reputation firms
also face increasing expectations (Mishina, Dykes,
Block, & Pollock, 2010; Zavyalova et al., 2016). On the
one hand, these high expectations may increase the
pressure on and benefits for CEOs of high-reputation
firms to grow through acquisitions (Haleblian, Pfarrer,
& Kiley, 2017). On the other hand, they increase the
importance of avoiding negative responses to those
deals. When high-reputation firms receive negative at-
tention, criticism and scrutiny intensify, resulting
in greater investor penalties for high-reputation firms
than other firms (Brooks, Highhouse, Russell, & Mohr,
2003;Rhee&Haunschild, 2006;Zavyalovaet al., 2016).
Indeed, recent research suggests that CEOs of high-
reputation firms engage in frequent acquisitions but
also receive market penalties for doing so (Haleblian
et al., 2017). Among CEOs who have low acquisition-
related confidence, therefore, the potential downside
risk to their equity holdings is higher for CEOs leading
high-reputation firms than for those leadingother firms.
CEOs of high-reputation firms thus have a greater in-
centive to make additional positive announcements
around the acquisition announcementwhen they have
low acquisition-related confidence, thus strengthening
the association between impression offsetting and
subsequent options exercised by the CEO.
In summary, high-reputation firms face higher scru-
tiny and greater market penalties for negative attention
than do other firms. When they have low acquisition-
related confidence, we thus propose that acquiring
CEOs of high-reputation firms will be more motivated
to engage in offsetting thanCEOsof other firms,making
impression offsetting a stronger signal that CEOs lack
confidence in the acquisition. We thus expect that the
association between impression offsetting around ac-
quisitions and subsequentCEOstockoptions exercised
is stronger for CEOs of high-reputation firms than for
CEOs of other firms, and hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. The association between impression
offsetting around an acquisition announcement and
subsequent stock options exercised by theCEOwill be
moderated by firm reputation such that the associa-
tion will be stronger for firms with high reputation.
Environment-level moderator: Industry dynamism.
Downside risk may also be particularly salient
for acquiring CEOs whose firms operate in dynamic
industries. “Dynamic industries” are characterized
by instability and unpredictability (Dess & Beard, 1984;
Smart & Vertinsky, 1984), making it more difficult for
external parties to assess the potential value of the ac-
quisition, increasing CEO concerns about potential
downside reactions. Further, in dynamic conditions,
firm performance and investor reactions to acquisitions
are likely to fluctuate, with greater upswings and larger
downswings compared to more stable conditions
(McGrath, 2013; Stein & Stein, 1991). We thus suggest
that, among CEOs who have low acquisition-related
confidence, when industry dynamism is high, theywill
have more of an incentive to use impression offsetting
surrounding that acquisition than when dynamism is
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low. As such, we would expect that, in dynamic envi-
ronments, impression offsetting is a stronger ex ante
signal for low acquisition-related confidence, thus
strengthening the relationship between impression off-
setting around an acquisition announcement and sub-
sequentoptionexercising.Weoffer twoprimary reasons
for this prediction.
First, CEOs operating in dynamic industries are likely
more cognizant of the need to protect their financial
position. As a significant portion of CEOs’ personal fi-
nancial capital is typically tied to firm performance
(Finkelsteinetal., 2009), theytendtobeconcernedabout
the financial impact of short-term negative reactions to
their strategic actions (Devers et al., 2013). Because
market reactions to acquisition announcements in dy-
namic industries are more volatile than reactions to
similar announcements in more stable industries
(D’Aveni, 1994;Stein&Stein,1991), concerns regarding
thepotential for largemarket valuedownturns aremore
salient for CEOs of acquiring firms in more dynamic
industries than those in less dynamic industries. As we
argued earlier, when CEOs have low confidence in the
long-term value-creation potential of their acquisitions,
they will be more concerned that the deal will receive
negative attention. We propose that, when CEOs have
low acquisition-related confidence, those operating in
more dynamic industrieswill bemore concerned about
negative market reactions than those who operate in
less dynamic industries. As such, these CEOswill have
a greater incentive to make additional positive an-
nouncements around the acquisition announcement,
thus making impression offsetting a stronger signal of
low acquisition-related confidence and making the
positive association between impression offsetting and
subsequent option exercises stronger in this context.
Second, in dynamic industries, the level of infor-
mation asymmetry between managers and investors
is higher than in stable industries (Cormier, Houle, &
Ledoux, 2013). In such settings, investors will likely
search for signals to reduce these asymmetries
(Connelly et al., 2011). For CEOs who have low
acquisition-related confidence, the increased scrutiny
is likely troublesome because they may fear that in-
vestors will also not see long-term value in the
deal. Thus, understanding the heightened information
asymmetry concerns of investors, CEOs in dynamic
industries who have low acquisition-related confi-
dence will be more motivated to release additional
positiveunrelated information to reduce the scrutinyof
investors. Therefore,wewould expect that, in dynamic
environments, the positive association between im-
pression offsetting and subsequent option exercises
will be stronger.
In sum,we expect that, when acquiring CEOs have
low acquisition-related confidence, those operating
in dynamic industries will have more incentive to
engage in impression offsetting because they are
likely more concerned about protecting their finan-
cial positions from volatile market reactions and
mitigating the effect of investors’ heightened in-
formation search efforts than acquiringCEOs inmore
stable industries. As such, in dynamic environ-
ments, the use of impression offsetting should be a
stronger signal that CEOs have low confidence in
the value-enhancing potential of their acquisitions.
Thus, the positive association between impression
offsetting surrounding an acquisition and sub-
sequent stock option exercisedby theCEO is likely to
be stronger for firms in highly dynamic industries.
We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. The association between impression
offsetting around an acquisition announcement and
subsequent stock options exercised by theCEOwill be
moderated by industry dynamism such that the as-
sociation will be stronger for firms facing more dy-
namic industry conditions.
METHOD
Sample
Our sample included all acquisitions by S&P 500
firms in which both the acquirer and target were
public, U.S.-based firms. We retained transactions
for completed, majority acquisitions, greater than
100 million USD, and announced between 1995 and
2009 for which a press release announcing the ac-
quisition was available. Focusing on large acquisi-
tions allowed us to ensure that these were material
actions for the firm that represented decisions likely
to be driven by the CEO (e.g., Graffin et al., 2016;
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).
We developed a database from several sources.
Acquisition data were collected from the SDC Plati-
num Domestic Mergers database. We gathered press
releases for our announcement variables using the PR
Newswire and Business Wire databases available in
LexisNexis. We also collected data from Compustat
(firm-level and industry-level variables), the Center
for Research in Security Prices (our Annual b vari-
able), Thomson Reuters Insider Filing data (CEO
equity holdings changes), Eventus (stock market re-
action), Risk Metrics (board-level variables), and
ExecuComp (compensation and demographic vari-
ables). As explained below, our dependent variable
is measured based on equity actions in the period
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following the acquisition announcement. All pre-
dictor variables were thusmeasured one quarter-year
before the dependent variable, except for firm-level
control variables, which were measured one full year
before thedependentvariable.Our fulldatacollection
resulted in an initial sample size of 770 acquisitions,
reduced by missing data to a final analysis sample of
491 acquisitions.2
Dependent Variable
Subsequent Options Exercises. To determine
CEO level of expressed confidence in their firm’s
acquisition, we used a proxy established in prior
research, which has demonstrated subsequent exer-
cising of stock options by the CEO is an ex post
behavioral outcome reflecting the CEO’s level of
confidence in an acquisition (Devers et al., 2013).
The core premise here is that if CEOs are highly
confident in the long-term value-creation potential
of their acquisitions they will hold onto their stock
options to benefit from the appreciation in stock
value that they expect to occur. In contrast, if CEOs
have low confidence in the value-creation potential
of their acquisitions they will exercise options in
order to avoid the value erosion that could occur if
share prices decline (Devers et al., 2013). Using
Thomson Reuters Insider Filing data, summarized to
quarters, we measured Subsequent Options Exer-
cises as the ratio of (1) the options exercised by the
CEO in the quarter following the focal acquisition
and (2) the number of exercisable options held by the
CEO at the end of the prior year.3 We logged this
variable due to its skewed distribution. We focused
on stock option exercises for two key reasons. First,
stock options represent the single largest component
of CEO pay in U.S. public firms (Devers & Sanders,
2016). Second, because CEOs are awarded stock
options on a regular basis (annually, or more fre-
quently), they often hold several layers of options
(Steinbach, Holcomb, Holmes, Devers, & Cannella,
2017). Todiversify their holdings and avoid eventual
option expiration, they must exercise options peri-
odically. However, stock ownership policies often
require CEOs to retain specific levels of stock in their
firms over the long term (Shilon, 2015). Thus, their
discretion to access value from stock can be limited
relative to stock option exercise.
Independent Variable
Impression Offsetting. We measured Impression
Offsetting as the count of material, positive an-
nouncements made by the focal firm in a firm-
authored press release in the three-day period
centered on the announcement of the acquisition
(i.e., one day before and after) (Graffin et al., 2016).
Our measure is thus tightly aligned with the defini-
tion of impression offsetting as being the intentional
release of unrelated positive information surround-
ing an announcement. We use this narrow window
for three primary reasons. First, for a news an-
nouncement to add information that attenuates the
scrutiny a firm faces regarding an acquisition, the
positive news has to occur in the same news cycle as
the acquisition; going beyond a day around the ac-
quisition violates this requirement. Second, a short
window allows us to avoid situations in which the
firm generates news announcements in response to
how the market reacts to an acquisition announce-
ment. Finally, ourmeasure follows prior research on
impression offsetting (Graffin et al., 2016). Thus, our
measure allows us to stick to announcements made
in the same news cycle and ensures that the firm is
indeed planning on using the announcement as
impression offsetting and allows us to be consis-
tent with prior work in this area. Table 1 provides
a summary of announcement types and their
categorization.
Moderating Variables
CEO Age. We measured CEO Age as the age re-
ported in ExecuComp for the firm’s CEO in the year
of the acquisition.
High Reputation. Following prior research, we
measured High Reputation as a binary variable with
a value of 1 for firms that were included on either
Fortune’s Most Admired or theWall Street Journal’s
Corporate Reputation Survey, and a value of 0
2 Someof thedataused in this projectwereused inoneof
two other papers: Devers et al. (2013) and Graffin et al.
(2016). Specifically, data on impression offsetting actions
drew on data used by Graffin et al. (2016) while data on
stock option exercises came from the same data set as the
one used in Devers et al. (2013). Thus, the final data set for
this project includes some data from each of these studies
combined with additional data collected specifically for
this study.
3 CEOs often have options that have not yet vested, and
are, therefore, unexercisable; thus, we do not include
unexercisable options in the denominator for our de-
pendent variable. Nevertheless, supplemental analyses
using both exercisable and unexercisable options held, as
the denominator returned results consistent with those
presented.
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otherwise (Boivie, Graffin, Gentry, 2016; Pfarrer,
Pollock, & Rindova, 2010).4
Dynamism. We measured Dynamism by first
regressing industry sales on a year counter variable
with a five-yearwindow such that the value for year t
is calculated from a regression covering years t24
through t. We then divided the standard error by the
industry’s mean sales, generating a variable that
scales from 0 (i.e., perfect stability) upward (i.e., in-
dicating greater dynamism) (Dess & Beard, 1984;
McNamara et al., 2008).
Control Variables
Aswith ourmoderator variables that were assessed
across multiple levels, we controlled for possible al-
ternative explanations at the CEO, board, firm, in-
dustry, and acquisition levels.
CEO- and board-level controls. We included
eight controls at the CEO and board levels of ana-
lyses. To account for the potential idiosyncratic dif-
ferences in exercise behaviors among CEOs, we
controlled forCEO Prior Option Exercises, whichwe
measured using the same method as our Subsequent
Options Exercises dependent variable, except that
we measured this control in the quarter prior to our
dependent variable. We also controlled for CEO To-
tal Compensation, measured using ExecuComp’s
CEO total compensation variable (TDC1).5 We con-
trolled too for CEO Pay Structure to account for the
incentive structure of CEO pay using the ratio of
long-term pay to total pay (Carpenter & Sanders,
2002; Seo et al., 2015). To account for potential
risk preference differences associated with gender
(e.g., Jeong & Harrison, 2017), we controlled for CEO
Gender (Male) recorded as a 1 for a male CEO and 0
for a female CEO. To control for the potential that
CEO power may directly (e.g., general risk prefer-
ences) or indirectly (e.g., perceived ability to receive
replacement awards) affect exercise decisions, we
included CEO Tenure and CEO Power. CEO power
was measured as the sum of the standardized values
of four factors: (1) CEO duality, (2) the ratio of CEO
ownership to board ownership, (3) the ratio of the
number of directors appointed after theCEO’s tenure
began to the total number of directors, and (4) the
proportion of outside directors to the total board size
(Haynes & Hillman, 2010). Further, to account for
attention given tomonitoring theCEO,we controlled
for Busy Board, which we recorded as a dummy
variable indicating when 50% ormore of the board’s
outside directors served on three or more boards
(Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016). Finally, because
the presence of female directors may increase the
depth of monitoring discussions, we controlled for
Female Board Representation measured as the per-
centage of females on the board (Chen et al., 2016).
Firm- and industry-level controls. We included
six controls at the firm and industry levels of analysis.
Firms adapt their behaviors as theygainexperience in
acquiring other firms (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan,
2006). Thus, we controlled for Acquisition Experi-
ence, whichwemeasured as the count of acquisitions
that met our sample specifications, described above,
TABLE 1
Categorization of Announcements
Positive (Impression
Offsetting)
Other Material
Announcements
Earnings releases (above
expectations)
Earnings releases (at or
below expectations)
Earnings guidance (above
expectations)
Earnings guidance (at or
below expectations)
Change in dividend rate (all
observations are increases)
New executive or director
New product Divestiture or plant closing
Customer win Settlement of litigation or
other legal dispute
Social good (e.g., donation,
sponsorship)
Executive retirement
Received award from third party Change of stock exchange
listing
Capital return (i.e., buyback or
stock split)
Debt issuance
Results of a sponsored study Other acquisition
Completion of another
acquisition
Recall or safety issue
4 Like prior research, we use a combined list to keep a
roughly equal number (i.e., 20–25) of high-reputation firms
per year of the sample. In some years, theFortune list alone
has only 10 top firms.
5 In supplemental analyses,we tested several alternative
ways of controlling for CEOs’ financial resource needs: (a)
we split up cash and noncash compensation; (b) we used
ExecuComp’s TDC2 data item to capture the value of sal-
ary, annual bonus pay, other annual pay, restricted stock
grants, long-term incentive plan payouts, all options ex-
ercised, and all other pay,which reflects the compensation
actually received by a CEO in a given year; (c) total com-
pensation received over the preceding three years (sum of
TDC2 over prior three years); and (d) CEO relative pay
calculated based on a comparison to similar peer firms
following the analyses described in Seo et al. (2015). In
each of these cases, the results were consistent with those
presented.
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for the three years prior to the focal acquisition
(Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Reuer, Tong, & Wu,
2012; Sanders, 2001). To account for the differential
acquisition behaviors associated with the size and
profitability of the acquirer (Haleblianet al., 2009),we
controlled for Firm Size and Net Income. We mea-
sured Firm Size as the logged value of the acquiring
firm’s assets, and we measured Net Income as the
acquiring firm’s net income. Finally, to control for the
potential influenceof the relativevolatilityof the focal
firm’s stock, we controlled for Annual b, which we
measured using the Scholes–Williams beta calcula-
tion from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(Scholes & Williams, 1977). Firm acquisition behav-
iors may also be influenced by the relative prospects
of the acquiring firm’s industry. Accordingly, we
controlled for Munificence, by taking the regression
coefficients from the regressions we used for our Dy-
namism moderating variable and dividing those re-
gression coefficients by the industry’s mean sales
(Dess & Beard, 1984; McNamara et al., 2008). A zero
value indicated flat growth in the five-year window,
andpositive andnegative values indicatedpositive or
negative growth.
Acquisition-level controls. We included six con-
trols at the acquisition level in our analyses. First, to
partial out any influence that stock market reactions
have on CEO exercising of stock options, we con-
trolled for Stock Market Reaction to the acquisition
announcement.We calculated stockmarket reactions
using the cumulative abnormal return to the acquisi-
tion. Cumulative abnormal return was calculated
by comparing the observed stock return with the
predicted (or normal) return over the same time pe-
riod (Haleblian et al., 2006; McNamara et al., 2008).
To calculate the predicted return, we used a 250-day
estimation period (approximately one year of trading
days) from 295 days to 45 days before the acquisi-
tion (McNamara et al., 2008; Tian, Haleblian, &
Rajagopalan, 2011). To ensure that our event win-
dow was wider than our window for impression off-
settingannouncements (allowingus tocapturemarket
reactions to both the acquisition and any offsetting
announcements), we used an 11-day window from
five days before the acquisition to five days after the
acquisition (25,5) (Cuypers, Cuypers, &Martin, 2017;
Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004).6
Additionally, because the type of acquisition may
also be associatedwith the confidence aCEOhas in the
acquisition,we controlled forHostileAcquisitions and
StockConsideration, both ofwhichhavebeen found to
be associated with market reactions to acquisition an-
nouncements (Browne & Rosengren, 1987; Devers
et al., 2013; Schijven &Hitt, 2012; Seo et al., 2015).We
measured Hostile Acquisitions using the attitude
characterization in the SDC Platinum database. The
variable was a dummy variable, with a 1 if the acqui-
sition was a hostile takeover and 0 otherwise. We
measuredStockConsideration as the percentage of the
deal consideration paid by the acquiring firm in the
formof its ownstock.Since it is alsopossible that larger
acquisition size will precipitate larger responses from
the CEOs, we controlled forAcquisition Size based on
the total value of the focal acquisition.
It also may be that material announcements other
than those we categorized as positive could have an
association with subsequent CEO option exercise
behavior. Thus, following Graffin and colleagues
(2016), we also controlled for announcements other
than the announcements included in our impression
offsetting variable. We measured Other Material An-
nouncements as the count of material, non-positive an-
nouncements in a firm-authored press release within
one day of the acquisition announcement (co-
incidingwith ourmeasure for impression offsetting).
While impression offsetting announcements are
clearly positive (such as new product introductions
or positive earnings releases), our value for Other
Material Announcements included any neutral
or negative material announcements (such as the
announcement of an executive retiring or neutral/
negative earnings releases). We provide a more
detailed comparison of impression offsetting an-
nouncements compared to other material announce-
ments inTable 1.7To control for potential differential
announcement behavior by the firm making the
focal acquisition, we measured Baseline Positive
Announcements to capture the firm’s general ten-
dency to issue positive material press releases.
We used the same categorization as our Impression
Offsetting independent variable over the timeframe
between 121 days and 30 days prior to the focal
6 We also tested a range of alternative windows, ranging
from a three-day window (one day before to one day after
the acquisition) to a 21-day window (five days before to
15 days after). Our results are robust to all of the windows
tested.
7 We found only four instances of negative announce-
ments, and only one negative announcement that had a
nonzero valueonourdependent variable. Given this rarity,
we elected to combine announcements that would be la-
beled as “neutral” or “negative,” using the typology in
Graffin et al. (2016), into our one Other Material An-
nouncementsmeasure.
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acquisition announcement (again following Graffin
et al., 2016). The final value for this measure was the
average announcements per three (business)-day
window, to match the three days used in measuring
our independent variable.
Year dummy variables. Finally, we control for
year—as a series of dummy variables—to account
for macroeconomic influences that vary over time.
These year controls are present in all of our models,
though we omit them from our tables for clarity.
Analyses
Our observations were at the event level, with
some acquiring firms making more than one acqui-
sition in the sample. We used Tobit regression be-
cause our dependent variable, Subsequent Options
Exercises, was a continuous variable with a lower
bound of zero. Wooldridge (2009: 574) called these
types of variables a “corner solution response” be-
cause a “nontrivial fraction of thepopulation”would
choose zero. In this case, many CEOs would choose
to exercise zero options in a particular quarter.
Tobit models are appropriate for dependent vari-
ables that are continuous and that are bounded from
above, below, or both (Amemiya, 1984; Gamache,
McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015; Wooldridge,
2009). We also used robust standard errors clustered
by firm, as our observations, though not a panel, did
include multiple observed acquisitions made by
the same acquiring firm. Clustered robust standard
errors correct for violations of the independence
and homoscedasticity assumptions of ordinary least
squares resulting fromwithin-cluster (i.e., firm-level)
correlation of observations and between-cluster dif-
ferences in variances (Wooldridge, 2009). We also
standardized all nonbinary variables before creating
interaction terms and included all consecutive terms
inour regressionequations (Brambor,Clark,&Golder,
2006).
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and in-
tercorrelations for our study. Table 3 presents the
results of our analyses. Model 1 includes all control
variables. As expected,manyof our control variables
are significant predictors of options exercised fol-
lowing an acquisition.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that impression offsetting
surrounding an acquisition announcement would
be positively associated with subsequent options
exercises. In Model 2, we include our independent
variable: impression offsetting. In bothModels 2 and
6 (the full model with all interaction variables), the
coefficient for impression offsetting is statistically
significant and positive, p , .001, supporting Hy-
pothesis 1. Inpractical terms, aCEOwhomakes three
impression offsetting announcements around an
acquisition will exercise 6.7% more options in the
next quarter than a CEO of a firm that makes zero
impression offsetting announcements around an
acquisition. If the options a CEO exercises are at the
mean value of their exercisable option holdings, this
represents a difference in options exercised of about
$220,000.8,9
In Models 3 to 5 of Table 3, we include our hy-
pothesized moderator effects with the full model
(Model 6) including all hypothesized associations.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the association be-
tween impression offsetting around an acquisition
announcement and subsequent options exercises
would be stronger for older CEOs. In Models 3 and
6, the coefficient for the interaction is statistically
significant and positive, p , .001, providing evi-
dence supporting Hypothesis 2. This interaction is
presented graphically in Figure 1, showing a higher
slope for the line representing a CEO age one
standard deviation above the mean. A simple
slopes analysis confirmed this: the slope of the line
for high age (11 SD) is positive, p, .001, while the
slope of the line for low age (21 SD) is negative, p,
.001. In practical terms, for CEOs who make three
impression offsetting announcements, higher age
for a CEO (one standard deviation above the mean)
is associated with the exercising of 27.62% more
options compared to more youthful CEOs (one
standard deviation below the mean), representing
a difference of approximately $850,000 in options
exercised at the mean value of exercisable options.
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the association
between impression offsetting around an acquisition
announcement and subsequent options exercises
8 Naturally, we expect CEOs to exercise the options that
are most valuable, so our calculations represent a conser-
vative estimation of the difference in options exercised.
9 In the full model (Model 6), the coefficient of impres-
sion on represents the effect of impression offsetting on
subsequent acquisition activity conditional on the in-
teraction terms being 0. Because we standardized all non-
dichotomous variables, this means that the coefficient for
impression offsetting represents the effect of impression
offsetting on subsequent acquisition activity conditional
on the valueofDynamismandCEOAgebeing at theirmean
and High Reputation being 0 (non-high-reputation firms).
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would be stronger for firms with high reputations. In
both Models 4 and 6, the coefficient for the in-
teraction is statistically significant and positive, p,
.001, supporting Hypothesis 3. This interaction is
graphed in Figure 2, showing a higher slope for the
line representing a firm with high reputation. A
simple slopes analysis confirmed the graphical rep-
resentation: the slope of the line for high-reputation
TABLE 3
Effects of Impression Offsetting on Subsequent Option Exercises
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 23.1475*** 23.1531*** 23.1368*** 23.1457*** 23.1140*** 23.0953***
(0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Controls
CEO Prior Opt. Exercises 0.0782*** 0.0789*** 0.0804*** 0.0794*** 0.0790*** 0.0813***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
CEO Total Compensation 0.0354*** 0.0326*** 0.0280*** 0.0315*** 0.0394*** 0.0340***
(0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0071)
CEO Pay Structure 0.0021 0.0041 0.0057 0.0041 0.0046 0.0065
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0050)
CEO Gender (Male) 2.8208*** 2.8336*** 2.8126*** 2.8283*** 2.8161*** 2.7958***
(0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0201)
CEO Tenure 20.0363*** 20.0401*** 20.0434*** 20.0406*** 20.0326*** 20.0361***
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0054)
CEO Power 0.0636*** 0.0627*** 0.0650*** 0.0626*** 0.0612*** 0.0636***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Busy Board 0.0149*** 0.0148*** 0.0154*** 0.0151*** 0.0153*** 0.0165***
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Female Board Representation 20.0248*** 20.0251*** 20.0243*** 20.0241*** 20.0235*** 20.0218***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0050)
Acquisition Experience 20.0599*** 20.0623*** 20.0627*** 20.0601*** 20.0617*** 20.0600***
(0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0054)
Firm Size 20.0086 20.0087 20.0099 20.0082 20.0073 20.0073
(0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Net Income 0.0306*** 0.0208* 0.0249** 0.0192* 0.0202* 0.0218*
(0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0090)
Munificence 20.0462*** 20.0441*** 20.0452*** 20.0459*** 20.0536*** 20.0583***
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0062)
Annual b 0.0461*** 0.0476*** 0.0469*** 0.0471*** 0.0478*** 0.0467***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Stock Market Reaction 20.0108*** 20.0107*** 20.0091*** 20.0118*** 20.0128*** 20.0126***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Hostile Acquisition 0.1748*** 0.1713*** 0.1654*** 0.1698*** 0.1920*** 0.1863***
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0166) (0.0165)
Stock Consideration 20.0668*** 20.0639*** 20.0649*** 20.0656*** 20.0571*** 20.0594***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0048)
Acquisition Size 20.0194*** 20.0163*** 20.0156*** 20.0151*** 20.0168*** 20.0147***
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0042)
Other Material Announcements 20.0001 20.0004 0.0002 20.0030 0.0008 20.0015
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0050)
Baseline Positive Announcements 0.2991*** 0.2530*** 0.3118*** 0.2510*** 0.2340*** 0.2974***
(0.0633) (0.0641) (0.0634) (0.0655) (0.0643) (0.0644)
CEO Age 20.0096† 20.0078 20.0010 20.0079 20.0114* 20.0040
(0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0056)
High Reputation 20.1720*** 20.1692*** 20.1743*** 20.2008*** 20.1866*** 20.2258***
(0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0216) (0.0310) (0.0219) (0.0286)
Dynamism 20.0021 20.0006 20.0005 20.0006 0.0145*** 0.0161***
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0029)
Interactions
CEO Age 3 Impression Offsetting 0.0471*** 0.0541***
(0.0046) (0.0059)
High Reputation3 Impression Offsetting 0.0817*** 0.0917***
(0.0245) (0.0242)
Dynamism3 Impression Offsetting 0.0900*** 0.0992***
(0.0064) (0.0069)
Independent Variable
Impression Offsetting 0.0319*** 0.0110† 0.0283*** 0.0507*** 0.0243***
(0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0072)
Probability. F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: n 5 491 for each model. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year dummy variables included, but omitted from the tables.
†p , .1
*p , .05
**p , .01
***p , .001
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firms is positive, p, .001, while the slope of the line
for not-high-reputation firms is not significant, p .
.05. Thus, CEOs who are in high-reputation firms
appear hesitant to exercise options if they have not
also issued impression offsetting announcements. In
fact, after announcing an acquisition, CEOs of high-
reputation firms exercise approximately 10% of
the option value that CEOs of other firms exercise
when the firm makes zero impression offsetting an-
nouncements. At the mean of exercisable options,
this translates to a difference of nearly $3M.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the association between
impression offsetting around an acquisition announce-
ment and subsequent stock options exercised by the
CEO would be stronger for firms facing highly dy-
namic industry conditions. In both Models 5 and 6,
the coefficient for the interaction is statistically sig-
nificant andpositive,p, .001, providing evidence for
Hypothesis 4. This interaction is presented graphi-
cally in Figure 3, showing a higher slope for the line
representing a firm inan industrywithdynamismone
standard deviation above the mean. A simple slopes
analysis confirmed the graphical representation: the
slope of the line for high dynamism (11 SD) is posi-
tive, p , .001, while the slope of the line for low dy-
namism (21 SD) is negative, p , .001. In this case,
among firmsmaking three offsetting announcements,
CEOs in highly dynamic industries (one standard de-
viation above the mean) exercise 61.3%more options
than CEOs in less dynamic industries (one standard
deviation below themean) representing a difference of
approximately $1.7M in options exercised (assuming
the mean value of exercisable options).
Influence of Generalized Overconfidence
A central point in our theory is that CEOs will
use impression offsetting when they have low con-
fidence in the long-term value potential of their
acquisitions. Our focus here has been on the
situation-specific confidence that a CEOhas toward
a specific acquisition. Other work, however, has
suggested that some CEOs have a high level of gen-
eralized (or trait) overconfidence (e.g., Campbell et
al., 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier
& Tate, 2005). By focusing on situation-specific
confidence, our underlying assumption has been
that, regardless of a CEO’s trait level of over-
confidence, when they make an acquisition based
on self-interested motives, they will be less confi-
dent in that acquisition than they would have been
otherwise.
To confirm that our hypothesized association is
not merely capturing differences in CEO generalized
overconfidence, we conducted supplement analysis
in which we controlled for trait overconfidence in
two ways. First, we measured CEO overconfidence
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following ameasure used byHayward andHambrick
(1997) and calculating the CEO’s total compensation
divided by the compensation of the second-highest
paid executive. We used this measure instead of our
control for CEO total compensation in our model (to
avoid including the same variable twice). Second,
we also incorporated a measure of overconfidence,
following the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005,
2008) and Campbell and colleagues (2011). This
measure is based on the premise that executives
“typically hold undiversified portfolios and should
exercise options early if they are rational expected
utility maximizers” (Campbell et al., 2011: 700). A
CEO is believed to be overconfident if they hold ex-
ercisable stock options for which the stock price
exceeds the exercise price by 100% or more. Thus, a
CEOwho holds exercisable options at 100% ormore
in the money for two years in our sample was clas-
sified as overconfident, beginning with the first year
they exhibited this behavior (Campbell et al., 2011;
Chen et al., 2015; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011).
We then reran our analyses with these two mea-
sures of trait overconfidence included. We found
results consistent with our initial analyses and
supporting our hypotheses. Thus, even after ac-
counting for a CEO’s trait level of overconfidence,
we can conclude that impression offsetting around
an acquisition is positively related to subse-
quent options exercised in the period following
the acquisition announcement. This provides ad-
ditional support for our assertion that CEOs use
impression offsetting when their confidence in
the value-creation potential of the acquisition is low.
Further, both of the measures of trait overconfidence
are negative and statistically significant predictors of
subsequent options exercised, p, .001. This is as we
would expect and consistent with prior research
indicating that options exercised is an ex post be-
havioral outcome of confidence in the long-term
value-creating potential of the acquisition.
Accounting for Potential Endogeneity
Although our primary models included many
relevant control variables, it is still possible that
some unknown omitted variable could influence
both impression offsetting and subsequent exercis-
ing of stock options.We took two steps to account for
the potential of endogeneity biasing our findings due
to omitted variable bias. First, we used a two-stage
residual inclusion Tobit model (Hausman, 1978),
wherein the first stage uses negative binomial
regression to predict the number of impression
offsetting announcements. We used average top
management team total compensation and acquisi-
tion unrelatedness as instruments, which have pre-
viously been used as instruments or independent
variables for impression offsetting (Graffin et al.,
2016) but are both theoretically and empirically un-
related to the subsequent exercising of stock options.
The second stage then included all predictor vari-
ables plus the residuals from the first stage, creating
a treatment effects regression. The results of the
two-stage analysis are fully consistent with those
presented.
Second, we tested for the Impact Threshold of
a Confounding Variable (ITCV). The “impact
threshold of a confounding variable” test allowed
us to calculate how strongly correlated an omitted
variable would have to be in order to change our
results (Busenbark et al., 2017; Frank, 2000;
Harrison, Boivie, Sharp, & Gentry, 2018; Hubbard,
Christensen, & Graffin, 2017). The results of this test
indicated that an omitted variable would need to be
correlated at .274 with both our independent vari-
able (impression offsetting) and our dependent var-
iable (subsequent options exercises) to overturn our
findings. Based on the correlations in our study, be-
tween these two variables and our control variables,
it appears highly unlikely that an omitted variable
would exhibit a correlation of that magnitude. The
strongest correlated variable with impression off-
setting is net income, r 5 .382, which is only corre-
lated at r 5 2.054 with subsequent options
exercised. Similarly, the strongest correlated vari-
able with subsequent options exercised is prior op-
tions exercised, r5 .267, which is only correlated at
r 5 2.030 with impression offsetting. Thus, this
pattern of findings suggests it is unlikely that an
unmeasured variable would be correlated strongly
with both key variables.
Potential Influence of Ratio Measure for
Dependent Variable
To be consistent with prior research, we used a
ratio for our dependent variable. We recognize,
however, that some have expressed concern over the
use of ratios as dependent variables (Wiseman,
2010). To alleviate this potential concern, we con-
ducted supplemental analyses using the number of
options exercised by the CEO in the quarter follow-
ing the focal acquisition (logged) as our dependent
variable and controlling for the number of exercis-
able options held by the CEO at the same point in
time, and using the same set of controls as our
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primary analysis. Again, the results from these ad-
ditional analyses are consistent with those reported.
DISCUSSION
Scholars and regulators have long recognized that
CEOs often pursue actions for reasons other than the
creation of shareholder value (Berle &Means, 1932).
It is in the interest of shareholders, however, to
understandwhenCEOs are championing efforts they
believe will generate value for shareholders versus
when they are undertaking actions for their own
benefits or due to social pressures (Dalton, Hitt,
Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Devers, Cannella, Reilly, &
Yoder, 2007). Our study addresses this important
concern by exploring a potential early warning signal
for when CEOs have low confidence in the long-term
value potential of their strategic actions: impression
offsetting.
Scholars recently identified a behavioral outcome
associated with low CEO confidence in the value-
creation potential of an announced acquisition
(Devers et al., 2013). Building on work that suggests
CEO confidence in the firm’s prospects for future
growth can be gleaned from their personal equity
actions (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005), Devers and
colleagues (2013) found that acquiring CEOs sys-
tematically exercised options in the quarters fol-
lowing acquisitions, demonstrating low confidence
in their own acquisitions. This research provides an
ex post means to determine when a CEO acted pri-
marily in their self-interest or in response to social
pressures.
In this study, we drew on AIM research (Graffin
et al., 2016; Graffin et al., 2011) to advance impres-
sion offsetting as an ex ante means of assessing
whether or not CEOs appear to have confidence in
their acquisitions. We theorized acquiring CEOs are
likely to use impression offsetting to reduce scru-
tiny when they primarily acquire either for self-
interested reasons or due to social pressures. In these
situations, impression offsetting can serve to protect
the value of CEO compensation and firm equity
stakes, and reduce the potential for public criticism.
Using option exercises as an ex post proxy for low
CEO confidence in an acquisition, our results reveal
that impression offsetting around an acquisition an-
nouncement is positively associated with the per-
centage of stock options exercised by the CEO in the
period following the announcement. Further, this
relationship is stronger in contexts where CEOs
are likely to experience greater downside risk sa-
lience. These findings suggest impression offsetting
around acquisition announcements is a novel and
useful signal that a CEO may be undertaking an ac-
quisition in which they have low confidence.
In this way, our paper provides a unique and
valuable addition to research examining signals in-
vestors use for understanding firm actions and pre-
dicting firm outcomes. Prior research in related
fields has discussed the value of identifying early
signals of desired behaviors that can only be fully
observed later. For example, in the organizational
behavior literature, research has examined the re-
lationship between job embeddedness and turnover.
Embeddedness actions signal a person’s intention to
commit to an organization and can be seen in observ-
able behavior (e.g., joining more teams, making
friendships at work, mentoring others) early in a per-
son’s tenure at the organization. In turn, embedded-
ness has been shown to be related to a reduced
likelihood of turnover (an ex post measure of behav-
ioral commitment to an organization) in a number of
studies (Jiang, Liu, McKay, Lee, &Mitchell, 2012; Lee,
Mitchell,Sablynski,Burton,&Holtom,2004;Mitchell,
Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, & Erez, 2001). Our findings
extend this logic to the strategy field and suggest im-
pression offsetting is a signal that can unintentionally
inform investors of the motives of CEOs undertaking
acquisitions. Thus, impression offsettingmay serve as
a valuable signal not only to interpret the potential
long-term value of a specific deal but also to provide
insights into the broader motives of firm leaders.
Our results, therefore, make several contributions
to management research. First, our work suggests
that impression offsetting is an ex ante signal that a
CEO may have low confidence in the value-creation
potential of an acquisition. This earlywarning signal
is particularly valuable for investors looking to un-
derstand patterns of firm action. This contribution
also relates to the obvious practical implication of our
work—that investors can use impression offsetting
surrounding an acquisition as a signal that it may not
be in the best interest of shareholders. Thus, when an
acquisition announcement is accompanied by other
unrelated announcements, investors should closely
examine the value potential of the deal. Second, prior
research has largely ignored why organizational
leaders engage in impression management activities
around some strategic announcements but not others.
Thus, our theory and findings contribute to this re-
search by suggesting a motivation for why CEOs en-
gage in this activity. It appears that, in the context of
acquisitions, CEOs engage in impression offsetting
when they have low confidence in the value-creation
potential of that action. By making such a link, our
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study provides a better understanding of why firms
engage in impression offsetting.
Our study also offers insights to signaling theory
and provides a wide range of future research oppor-
tunities. Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) provides an
analytical framework to explain how exchange
parties communicate unobservable quality through
observable characteristics. Strategy scholars have
built on the signaling framework to analyze how a
firm’s underlying quality can be translated into
market signals shaping the firm’s market valuation
(e.g., Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Certo, 2003;
Certo, Covin, Daily, &Dalton, 2001;Higgins &Gulati,
2006; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). This research has
primarily focused on intentional signals that execu-
tives send, but, in the present study, we find evi-
dence of anunintended signal that executives appear
to be sending—that they lack confidence in an
acquisition—with their use of impression offsetting.
Thus, ourwork has the potential to add a new stream
to signaling theory on this and other unintended
signals sent through impressionmanagement tactics.
Similarly, our findings offer potential insight into
the behavioral drivers of organization action. One of
the unknowns in behavioral research is how the be-
havioral triggers that lead to organizational actions
influence the degree of confidencemanagers have in
these actions.Our findings offer ameans to assess the
degree of confidence CEOs have in a range of actions
that may be driven by behavioral processes. For ex-
ample, future research could examine whether ac-
tions that arise fromproblemistic versus slack search
lead to different reliance on impression offsetting.
Similarly, research could examine whether acquisi-
tions driven by a firm’s proactive search efforts or in
response to social pressures, such as during merger
and acquisition waves (Haleblian et al., 2012), differ
in the degree to which managers use impression
offsetting. Such lines of examination could offer in-
sight on how different acquisition drivers influence
the confidence management evidence.
Our findings also contribute to research on corpo-
rate reputation (for a review, see Lange et al., 2011).
Our analysis indicates a statistically significant nega-
tive main effect of high reputation on exercising op-
tions following an acquisition combined with the
positive interaction effect of high reputation and im-
pression offsetting. These findings suggest that the
visibility and attention a firm gains as a result of a
high reputation (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Zavyalova
et al., 2016) make the CEO hesitant to exercise op-
tions following an acquisition announcement—unless,
of course, they engaging in impression offsetting.
Interestingly, this suggests that CEOs are concerned
about the scrutiny they are under when they lead a
high-reputation firm; however, they believe that, by
using impression offsetting, they can effectively re-
duce the scrutiny enough that they feel free to exer-
cise options. Essentially, in spite of the attention that
high-reputation firms receive, by using impression
offsetting, CEOs of high-reputation firms appear
willing to undertake acquisitions inwhich they have
low confidence.
Our work provides several additional avenues for
future research. First, while we believe option exer-
cise is the best available proxy of CEOconfidence and
is well grounded in the literature (e.g., Devers et al.,
2013; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008), future re-
search could further examine this issue. Since in-
vestors and other firm stakeholders are likely to be
interested in understanding the degree of confidence
CEOs have in actions they are championing, future
research could examine alternative unobtrusivemea-
sures of CEO confidence and compare their relative
strength as signals of confidence. This could include
research from field data as well as experimental data
that could compare survey-based measures of confi-
dence with behavioral signals of confidence.
Second, researchers could extend ourwork beyond
the acquisition context. While we expect that CEOs
are likely to use impression offsetting in similar ways
around other major strategic actions, future research
could explore other contexts to provide boundary
conditions for our theory. For example, it might be
interesting for corporate governance researchers to
explore the use of impression offsetting around an-
nouncements of increases to executives’ compensa-
tion or amplified CEO power. Indeed, it may be that
CEOs will use impression offsetting or other forms of
AIM (e.g., strategic noise; Graffin et al., 2011) to lessen
the scrutiny theywill facewhen they exercise options
or alter their relationships with their boards. Thus,
future research could explore the conditions under
which CEOs engage in these practices surrounding
these and other governance-related actions.
It also may be interesting for researchers to explore
additional moderators to the association between im-
pression offsetting surrounding an acquisition and
subsequent exercising of stock options. In our paper,
we limited our focus to situations in which the CEO
was likely to be particularly salient of downside risk
potential, giving themadditionalmotivation to reduce
scrutiny on the acquisition and to protect their posi-
tionwith the firm.Oneparticularly interesting avenue
in this vein could be to integrate upper echelons the-
ory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and
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the use of impression offsetting. In our work, we find
that CEO age is an important moderator, with the as-
sociation between impression offsetting and the ex-
ercisingof stockoptionsbeing stronger for olderCEOs.
It may be, however, that some CEO personality char-
acteristics also increase or decrease the likelihood of
using impression offsettingwhen theCEOacquires for
self-interested reasons. For example, it could be that
CEOs high in narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007) desire that attention is focused on them and
don’t want to reduce scrutiny on them, making them
reticent to use impression offsetting even when they
are acquiring for self-interested reasons or due to so-
cial pressures. By contrast, CEOs with a high pre-
vention focus (Gamache et al., 2015) or utilizing a low
construal level (Steinbach, Gamache, & Johnson,
2018) may be particularly keen on avoiding scrutiny
of an acquisition and may be more likely to use im-
pression offsetting regardless of whether their confi-
dence about the value-creation potential of their
acquisitions is low or high.
Finally, consistent with recent governance scholar-
ship (Boivie et al., 2016Q:2 ), our research suggests a skep-
tical view of the effectiveness of corporate governance
at limiting CEO self-interested behavior. CEOs appear
to have adjusted their behavior to governance mecha-
nisms by using impression offsetting to help reduce
scrutinywhentheypursueself-interestedgains.Market
participants would be well advised to use this early
warning signal to bid down acquisitions in which im-
pression offsetting is used. More broadly, compensa-
tion and governance scholars would benefit by
continuing to study ways to reduce the likelihood that
CEOs act for personal gain, or in response to social
pressures, at the expense of long-term firm value. Fi-
nally, research could also explore additional gover-
nance mechanisms, which may help to reduce the
propensity of CEOs to engage in strategic actions for
self-interested motivations.
CONCLUSION
Although research has shown that AIM tech-
niques, such as impression offsetting, can effectively
shape investor reactions, this work has not yet ex-
plored the motivations behind these tactics (Graffin
et al., 2011; Graffin et al., 2016). By demonstrating a
positive association between impression offsetting
around acquisition announcements to subsequent
CEO option exercises, our findings suggest CEOs use
impression offsetting when they have low confi-
dence in the value-creation potential of those deals.
As such, although impression offsetting is effective
at reducing negative market reactions to acquisition
announcements (Graffin et al., 2016), this effect is
ironic, in that it is used when investors should be
most skeptical. We suspect that, while investors in-
dependently and rationally consider each piece of
firm information in isolation, our findings suggest
they are likely better served by examining the full
collection of announcements made by a firm. Thus,
impression offsetting can be a valuable signal of
managerial intentions, but it is a signal that should be
assessed in light of other signals the firm isproducing
and actions the firm is taking.
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